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Due Process in Undesirable Discharge Proceedings
It is generally agreed that a discharge "under other than honorable
conditions"' imposes serious consequences on a serviceman. Unlike an
honorable or a general discharge, an undesirable, bad-conduct, or dis-
honorable discharge may deprive a serviceman of nearly all veterans'
benefits,2 and inflict a stigma that reduces his civilian employment
potential.3 The civilian disabilities flow from the widespread knowledge
that the Armed Forces grant other than honorable discharges only to
willfully incompatible personnel-from repeated petty offenders, who
receive undesirable discharges, to court-martialled felons, who receive
dishonorable discharges. 4
A serviceman faced with an other than honorable discharge has much
at stake and, therefore, a strong interest in procedural safeguards. This
interest conflicts, however, with important military interests. The
Armed Forces need a swift and economical procedure for separating
from the service those who will not perform satisfactorily. The ser-
vices also require a means of penalizing offenders by imposing dis-
abilities that affect both their veterans' benefits and their civilian
careers.5
Where a dishonorable or bad-conduct discharge is sought, the inter-
ests of the serviceman in procedural protections have been recognized
I For the purposes of this comment, "other than honorable discharge" refers to the
undesirable, bad-conduct, and dishonorable discharges, the three types which limit eligi-
bility for veterans' benefits. See text and notes at notes 69-71 infra. The term "less than
honorable discharges," frequently used by the courts, see, e.g., Sofranoff v. United States,
165 Ct. Cl. 470, 478 (1964), adds the general discharge to the former group, reflecting the
fact that any discharge except the honorable discharge has some stigmatic effect in the
civilian community. See Sofranoff v. United States, supra; Army Reg. 635-212, change no.
11, at 3 (March 1, 1971); Jones, The Gravity of Administrative Discharges, 59 Mu.. L. REv.
1, 25 (1973). The general discharge, however, has significantly less stigmatic effect than the
other than honorable discharges. See id.
2 Hearings on H.R. 523 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on Armed Serv-
ices, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 6010 (table) (1971) [hereinafter cited as 1971 Hearings].
3 See, e.g., Bland v. Connally, 293 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Stapp v. Resor, 314 F. Supp.
475 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Glidden v. United States, 185 Ct. Cl. 515 (1968); Clackum v. United
States, 296 F.2d 226 (Ct. Cl. 1961). See also Lane, Evidence and the Administrative Dis-
charge Board, 55 Mu. L. Rav. 95, 98-100 (1972).
4 See Bland v. Connally, 293 F.2d 852, 858 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Sofranoff v. United States,
165 Ct. Cl. 470, 478 (1964); Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on the Constitutional Rights of Military Personnel, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. 187-88 (1962) [hereinafter cited as 1962 Hearings]; Jones, supra note 1, at
15, 22-25.
5 See text and notes at notes 61-74 infra.
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as outweighing the military's interest in a simple discharge procedure
with punitive effect, and the serviceman is accorded substantial pro-
cedural protections. 6 The major conflict between military and service-
man interests occurs when an undesirable discharge-"an administra-
tive separation under conditions other than honorable" 7-is ordered.
The undesirable and bad-conduct discharges are often alternative
means of punishing the same offense,8 and the effects of the two pen-
alties are substantially identical. 9 Nevertheless, the serviceman given
an undesirable discharge is denied several of the protections recog-
nized as necessary for imposition of a bad-conduct discharge. ° This
disparity has been criticized as needlessly unfair to servicemen," but
all attempts to reform the undesirable discharge have been legislative.'2
It appears, however, that the regulations governing undesirable dis-
charges are also constitutionally deficient. The courts can remedy these
deficiencies by exercising their long-recognized authority to review
military administrative actions. This comment examines the due proc-
ess implications of undesirable discharge procedures, using the recog-
nized protections of the bad-conduct discharge procedure as a
benchmark.'3
6 For a discussion of the protections provided in courts-martial, see text and notes at
notes 42-49 infra.
7 Army Reg. 635-200, change no. 14, 1-9f, at 1-5 (Oct. 4, 1969); 32 C.F.R. § 41.8(n)
(1972); id. § 730.1(a)(13) (1972) (Navy). The problem is a substantial one. The Armed
Forces imposed 15,120 undesirable discharges in fiscal year 1970, the last year for which
complete figures are available. Between fiscal 1967 and the first half of fiscal 1971 they
imposed 36,883 undesirable discharges. 1971 Hearings, supra note 2, at 5868.
8 See text and notes at notes 15-26 infra.
9 See text and notes at notes 68-70 infra.
10 See text and notes at notes 29-41 infra.
11 See, e.g., Dougherty & Lynch, Administrative Discharge: Military Justice?, 33 GEo.
WAsH. L. Rxv. 498 (1964); Everett, Military Administrative Discharge-The Pendulum
Swings, 1966 DuKE LJ. 41; Lynch, Administrative Discharge: Changes Needed?, 22 MAINE
L. Rv. 141 (1970).
12 There are two proposed administrative discharge reform bills: S. 2247, 92d Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1971) (the Ervin Bill), and H.R. 523, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971) (the Bennett Bill).
The Bennett Bill would leave the Defense Department with the authority to prescribe
grounds for administrative discharge and define the rules of evidence used in board hear-
ings. Its major change is to enact the current hearing procedures provided by 82 C.F.R.
§ 41 (1972) and add the power to subpoena witnesses. The Ervin Bill would enact a new
chapter of Title 10 of the United States Code, dealing with administrative discharge. It
would limit the grounds for undesirable discharge, provide rules of evidence for the board
hearing, and require the presence of a law officer as chairman of the board. Although the
Defense Department is not unsympathetic to the Bennett Bill, neither proposal has been
reported out of committee for several sessions of Congress. For a detailed criticism of
both bills, see Lane, supra note 3 and Lynch, supra note 11, at 158-66. A more sympathetic
view of the Ervin proposals is found in Everett, supra note 11.
13 The grounds and procedures for.undesirable discharge might also be attacked as
denials of equal protection, particularly when undesirable discharge is imposed for acts
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I. GROUNDS AND PROCEDURES FOR UNDESIRABLE AND
BAD-CONDUCT DISCHARGES
Misbehavior that may lead to an undesirable discharge is classified
under two headings: "unfitness" and "misconduct."1 4 Misconduct con-
sists of prolonged AWOL, fraudulent enlistment, or civilian convic-
tion of a crime that carries a minimum penalty of one year's imprison-
ment under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).15 Unfit-
ness includes acts of "sexual perversion . . . drug abuse . . . an estab-
lished pattern for shirking.., dishonorable failure to pay just debts,
alimony, or child support... [or] unsanitary habits."' 6 It also includes
"frequent involvement of a discreditable nature with military or civil-
ian authorities,"'17 which is the most common reason for undesirable
discharge.18 "Frequent and discreditable involvement" consists of re-
peated disciplinary encounters. These may be minor civilian or court-
martial convictions, or nonjudicial punishments given by the service-
man's commanding officer under Article 15 of the UCMJ.'
9 There is
no further clarification of how many or what types of disciplinary
actions are sufficient grounds for undesirable discharge of the "chronic
military offender."
2 0
that constitute crimes under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-950
(1970) [hereinafter cited as UCMJ]. This approach, however, has several difficulties. The
fact that courts-martial can impose punishments in addition to punitive discharge makes
it arguable that the recipients of undesirable discharges constitute a different class
altogether. In addition, it is difficult to contend that the different levels of procedural
protection have no rational relationship to legitimate military interests in discipline and
efficiency. Further, no suspect classification is involved. Cf. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677 (1973). Finally, the equal protection argument proves too much. It would require
the application of all the procedures of the UCMJ to the undesirable discharge, regardless
of whether they are necessary to its fundamental fairness. If denial of equal protection
is urged in terms of denial of fundamental rights extended to others, see, e.g., Vlandis v.
Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), discussion of the
fundamental nature of the procedural rights is more conveniently conducted in terms of
due process. The due process approach has the additional advantage of conforming to the
existing terminology used in the judicial review of military judicial and administrative
action. See, e.g., Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953); Clackum v. United States, 296 F.2d
226 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
14 32 C.F.R. § 41.5(c) (1972). Undesirable discharges issued for security reasons are out-
side the scope of this comment because of the peculiar problems surrounding the use of
classified information as evidence. See id. § 41.6(h); id. §§ 729.12(g)(3), (7) (1972). It is also
possible to request and receive an undesirable discharge "for the good of the service" in
lieu of court-martial. Id. § 41.6(k) (1972).
15 Id. § 41.6(j) (1972).
16 Id. §§ 41.6(i)(2)-(7) (1972).
17 Id. § 41.6(i)(1) (1972).
18 1971 Hearings, supra note 2, at 5870.
19 See Army Reg. 635-212, Appendix, at 20 (July 15, 1966); 32 C.F.R. § 730.12(g) (1972).
20 See text and note at note 188 infra.
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Many of the acts justifying separation by undesirable discharge are
also grounds for bad-conduct discharge after court-martial. Fraudulent
enlistmentr' and AWOL22 are specifically named as crimes in the Code.
Drug use and dishonorable failure to pay debts are punishable under
Article 134, the catch-all provision of the UCMJ.23 The Code definition
of sodomy is broad enough to include acts of sexual perversion.24 An
established pattern for shirking may include the UCMJ crime of dis-
obedience to lawful orders. 25 Moreover, some chronic offenders may re-
ceive bad-conduct discharges for conviction of a minor offense if they
have two or more previous convictions by a court.26
An undesirable discharge is given by the "discharge authority," an
officer with general court-martial jurisdiction.27 No serviceman can be
given an undesirable discharge without his consent 28 unless a hearing
board (the "administrative discharge board")29 recommends it. The
board consists of three officers, one of whom must be at least a major,
but none of whom are required to have legal training.3 0 The service-
21 10 U.S.C. § 883 (1970); MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNrrED STATES, 1969, 162, at
28-9 [hereinafter cited as MCMI. The maximum penalty is dishonorable discharge and
one year of imprisonment. MCM 127c, at 25-11.
22 10 U.S.C. § 886 (1970); MCM, supra note 21, at 28-14. The maximum penalty for
being AWOL more than thirty days at a time is dishonorable discharge and one year of
imprisonment. AWOL for more than three but less than thirty days is punishable by six
months imprisonment without discharge and two-thirds forfeiture of pay for six months.
Id. 127c, at 25-1.
23 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1970); MCM, supra note 21, 213b, at 28-72; id. 213f, at 28-
77. Possession of marijuana carries a maximum penalty of five years imprisonment and
dishonorable discharge, while the penalty for hard drugs is ten years and dishonorable
discharge. Id. 127c, at 25-15. Failure to pay debts may be penalized by bad-conduct dis-
charge and six months imprisonment. Id. But cf. Levy v. Parker, 478 F.2d 772 (3d Cir.
1973); Avrech v. Secretary of the Navy, 477 F.2d 1237 (D.C. Cir.), prob. juris. noted, 94 Sup.
Ct. 64 (1973).
24 "Any person ... who engages in unnatural carnal copulation with another person
of the same or opposite sex or with an animal is guilty of sodomy." 10 U.S.C. § 925 (1970);
MCM, supra note 21, 204, at 28-59. Consensual sodomy with a partner sixteen years or
older carries a maximum penalty of dishonorable discharge and five years imprisonment.
Id. 127c, at 25-14.
25 10 U.S.C. § 892 (1970); MCM, supra note 21, 171, at 28-22. Knowing failure to
obey a lawful order may be punished by bad-conduct discharge and six months imprison-
ment. Id. 127c, at 25-12.
28 MCM, supra note 21, 127c, Section B, at 25-17. The conduct must also have been
within three years of the offense for which discharge is sought. Id.
27 32 C.F.R. § 41.7(d) (1972). Commanders, normally Major Generals or above, of units
of division size or larger possess general court-martial jurisdiction. 10 U.S.C. § 822 (1970).
28 The most obvious reason for accepting an undesirable discharge is to avoid court-
martial. See note 31 infra.
29 32 C.F.R. § 41.7(d)(1) (1972).
30 Id. § 41.8(a) (1972).
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man has a right to notice of the grounds for discharge, representation
by counsel, and a board hearing that he may attend with counsel.
3 1
The board develops the record on which the discharge authority
acts, and can veto an undesirable discharge.3 2 The hearing is there-
fore the critical stage of the discharge process. The board is free to
consider any relevant, material evidence, without regard to formal
evidentiary rules. 33 Although the "highest quality of evidence obtain-
able" is required by the Army,34 all of the services allow the use of
affidavits and other written statements. 5 The serviceman or his coun-
sel may cross-examine any witness who appears and may request the
production of any witness. 36 The hearing board, however, can compel
the attendance only of active duty personnel; it has no power to
subpoena civilians.3 7 In lieu of an absent witness, his ex parte state-
ments are admissible.38 The board may recommend undesirable, gen-
eral, or honorable discharge3 9 on the basis of "reasonably satisfactory"
evidence. The discharge authority may accept the recommendations
or act with more lenience; he cannot order a harsher discharge than
the board has found warranted.40 Administrative review, which is not
available until after discharge, presumes the correctness of the dis-
charge.41
31 Id. § 41.8(c) (1972). These rights may be waived after consultation with counsel. Id.
§ 41.7(d)(1). Individuals normally waive their right to a hearing in order to accept an
undesirable discharge in response to the threat of court-martial. See Haines v. United
States, 453 F.2d 233 (3d Cir. 1971); 32 C.F.R. § 41.6(k) (1972); 1962 Hearings, supra note 4,
at 139. The Air Force has found that the majority of airmen processed for undesirable
discharge waive their hearing rights "for reasons best known to themselves." 1962 Hearings,
supra note 4, at 141.
82 32 C.F.R. § 41.4(a)(2) (1972).
33 Id. § 41.8(b); Army Reg. 15-6, 10, at 5 (Aug. 12, 1966); 32 C.F.R. § 730.15(d)(1) (1972)
(Navy); cf. id. § 866.9(b) (1972) (Air Force).
34 Army Reg. 15-6, 9(1) (Aug. 12, 1966); cf. 32 C.F.R. § 866.9(a) (1972) (Air Force).
35 Army Reg. 15-6, 9(1)(e), (g) (Aug. 12, 1966); Am FORCE MANUAL 39-12 (summarized
in 1971 Hearings, supra note 2, at 5884); 32 C.F.R. § 730.15(d) (1972) (Navy); see Lynch,
supra note 11, at 153-54; cf. 32 C.F.R. § 41.8(b) (1972).
36 Army Reg. 635-212, 17c(2)(c), (f), at 10-12 (July 15, 1966); 32 C.F.R. §§ 730.15(e)(4),
(7) (1972) (Navy).
37 32 C.F.R. §§ 41.8(c)(3), 730.15(b) (1972). Furthermore, volunteer civilian witnesses
must appear at no expense to the government. Id.
38 See Dougherty & Lynch, supra note 11, at 512; Lynch, supra note 11, at 154.
39 32 C.F.R. § 41.8(b) (1972); Army Reg. 635-212, 17d, at 12 (July 15, 1966). The
standard of proof in administrative discharge hearings is apparently substantial evidence.
See Army Reg. 15-6, 20, at 7 (Aug. 12, 1966). The Navy does not specify a standard of
proof, but the Marine Corps requires a "preponderance of the evidence." 32 C.F.R.
§ 730.73(c)(20) (1972).
40 32 C.F.R. § 41.8(d) (1972); Army Reg. 635-212, 19d (July 15, 1966).
41 See Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary and a Special Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Armed Services,
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The bad-conduct discharge, on the other hand, can be imposed only
by a special or general court-martial,42 at which a military judge pre-
sides. 43 That tribunal has the same subpoena powers as a United States
District Court,4 4 and, "so far as not otherwise prescribed," follows the
"rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases
in the United States district courts."45 The defendant may cross-
examine all witnesses,40 and is provided with counsel certified compe-
tent to practice in the most serious military trials.47 The discharge can
be imposed only if the defendant is found guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt of the offense charged or a lesser included offense for which
punitive discharge is authorized.48 The discharge takes effect only after
administrative and judicial review.49
The procedures for imposing a bad-conduct discharge give the po-
tential recipient a high level of protection. When an undesirable dis-
charge is imposed, however, important procedural protections are lack-
ing. Three of these deficiencies-the denial of subpoena powers and
the right of confrontation, the low standard of proof, and vagueness
of the definition of acts justifying "chronic offender" discharge--de-
prive the discharge recipient of due process of law.
II. DUE PROCESS CONSIDERATIONS
Due process of law in an administrative proceeding is not an abso-
lute standard. Denomination of the individual interest as a "right" or
"privilege" is no longer significant.5 0 Described by Justice Frankfurter
89th Cong., 2d Sess. 890-91 (1966) [hereinafter cited as 1966 Hearings]; Dougherty & Lynch,
supra note 11, at 519-22. The progress of a typical undesirable discharge case through the
administrative process is described, id. at 501-16, and illustrated for the guidance of dis-
charge board members in Army Reg. 635-212, Appendix (July 15, 1966).
42 10 U.S.C. §§ 818-19 (1970); MCM, supra note 21, §§ 14-15, at 4-4-6. A summary
court-martial cannot impose punitive discharge. 10 U.S.C. § 820; MCM, supra note 21,
16, at 4-6.
43 10 U.S.C. §§ 826(a), 819 (1970); MCM, supra note 21, 15b, at 4-5. Military judges
are lawyer-officers, certified competent in military law, who are normally assigned to judicial
duties. 10 U.S.C. § 826(b) (1970); MCM, supra note 21, 4e, at 2-3.
44 10 U.S.C. § 846 (1970); MCM, supra note 21, 115d, at 23-2.
45 MCM, supra note 21, 187, at 27-4.
46 Id. 149b, at 27-54.
47 10 U.S.C. §§ 819, 827(b) (1970); MCM, supra note 21, 14b, at 4-4.
48 10 U.S.C. § 851(c) (1970); MCM, supra note 21, 74a(3), at 13-4; id. 76a(4), at
13-13; id. 127c, at 25-17.
49 A court-martial sentence including a bad-conduct discharge must be approved by
a commander having general court-martial jurisdiction and then by the Court of Military
Review before the discharge takes effect. 10 U.S.C. §§ 865(b), 866(b) (1970); MCM, supra
note 21, 84d, at 17-2; id. 98, at 20-1.
50 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971); Bell v. Burson, 402 US. 535, 539
(1971). The individual interest still must fit, however, under the "liberty" or "property"
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as "fundamental fairness," 51 due process in administrative proceed-
ings varies with the nature of the governmental function and the
seriousness of the potential harm to the individual.5 2 An individual's
opportunity to challenge facts on which the government will act must
be proportionate to the injury that may be inflicted by erroneous ac-
tion, discounted by the government's need for speed, economy, secrecy,
or maintenance of an efficient governmental organization.
53
Administrative discharges from the Armed Forces are reviewable in
the federal courts on three grounds:5 4 failure to follow regulations,55
lack of statutory authority to discharge,56 and failure to provide due
process.57 In Clackum v. United States,5s the Court of Claims held that
rubrics of the fourteenth amendment. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 62, 83 (1972). "Property"
appears to require at least a reasonable expectation of a public benefit. Compare Board
of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) with Perry v. Sindermann 408, U.S. 593, 601-
02 (1972). "Liberty" includes both public reputation, Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S.
433 (1970), and the ability to obtain employment, Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 492
(1959). But see Board of Regents v. Roth, supra, at 573-75; Cafeteria Workers Local 473
v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895-96 (1961). The dishonorable discharge dearly fits these
definitions. See text and notes at notes 61-74 infra.
51 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 161 (1951) (concurring
opinion).
52 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263
(1970); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-63 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J. concurring); cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
53 1 K.C. DAvis, ADMISTATIVE LAw TgRATiSE § 7.02, at 412 (1958); see, e.g., Morrissey
v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); cf. Perry v. Sinder-
mann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
54 Birt v. United States, 180 Ct. Cl. 910, 913 (1967). Judicial review of an undesirable
discharge is limited to the "legal sufficiency" of the discharge. Id. It is available through
two procedures. A discharged serviceman may request a declaratory judgment that the
discharge is void and a mandatory injunction for the issuance of an honorable discharge,
e.g., Stapp v. Resor, 314 F. Supp. 475 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), or he may sue in the Court of
Claims for the back pay he would have received had he completed his enlistment, e.g.,
Clackum v. United States, 296 F.2d 226 (Ct. Cl. 1960). In the latter instance, judgment
for the serviceman does not itself upgrade the discharge, but it does require a finding
that the discharge was wrongfully issued. This collaterally estops the government from
asserting the existence of an other than honorable discharge in any future proceeding.
See Meador, Judicial Determinations of Military Status, 72 YALE L.J. 1293, 1304-06 (1963).
See generally Suter, Judicial Review of Military Administrative Decisions, 6 HousTON L.
REv. 55 (1968). Most successful attacks on undesirable discharges rely on the failure of the
service to follow its own procedural regulations. Everett, supra note 11, at 75-78. Consti-
tutional issues raised by such attacks have been avoided by finding lack of statutory
authority to discharge, e.g., Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (1958); by finding violations
of procedural regulations, e.g., Glidden v. United States, 185 Ct. Cl. 515 (1968); or by
holding the challenge to be procedurally premature, e.g., Crawford v. Davis, 249 F. Supp.
943 (E.D. Pa. 1966). For cases dealing with the problems caused by premature attempts at
judicial review of a discharge, see note 120 infra; Suter, supra, at 73-77.
55 E.g., Conn v. United States, 376 F.2d 878 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
56 E.g., Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (1958).
57 Clackum v. United States, 296 F.2d 226 (Ct. Cl. 1960).
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regulations permitting an undesirable discharge without notice and
a hearing denied due process. It reasoned that:
[Tihe Air Force had the undoubted right to discharge [Clackum]
whenever it pleased, for any reason or for no reason, and by so
doing preserve the Air Force from even the slightest suspicion of
harboring undesirable characters. But it is unthinkable that it
should have the raw power, without respect for even the most
elementary notions of due process of law, to load her down with
penalties. It is late in the day to argue that everything that the
executives of the armed forces do in connection with the discharge
of soldiers is beyond the reach of judicial scrutiny.59
Clackum stands for two important principles. First, the undesirable
discharge is a penalty, and the serviceman has a right to procedural
safeguards in any proceeding through which such penalties may be im-
posed. Second, the military remains free to discharge anyone under
conditions characterized as honorable or as undesirable, but any limits
on the procedural safeguards of a discharge with punitive effects must
be justified by a military interest that outweighs the recipient's interest
in not being subject to erroneously inflicted injury. The courts must
therefore carefully examine the individual and military interests to be
balanced in determining the requirements of due process.
A. The Injury to the Individual
Any discharge from the military injures the unwilling recipient by
depriving him of his chosen career and foreclosing retirement benefits.60
Undesirable and bad-conduct discharges additionally cause denial of
veterans' benefits and injury to the recipient's reputation, both of which
reduce his employment and educational opportunities. In the unde-
sirable discharge situation, the serviceman's interest in protections that
will prevent erroneous imposition of these penalties is increased by
the particularly error-prone nature of the proceeding.
1. Civilian Consequences of an Undesirable Discharge. The unde-
sirable discharge officially labels an individual as unfit to serve in the
Armed Forces because of criminality, sexual deviancy, drug use, or
simply resistance to authority.61 His military record is thrown into
58 Id.
59 Id. at 228.
60 The military interest in eliminating unproductive personnel has been recognized as
suffidently strong to justify discharge without a hearing where the discharge is "under
honorable conditions" and provides full veterans' benefits. Birt v. United States, 180 Ct.
Cl. 910 (1967); cf. Reed v. Franke, 187 F. Supp. 905 (E.D. Va. 1961), aff'd, 297 F.2d 17 (1961);
Rowe v. United States, 167 Ct. Cl. 468 (1964).
61 See text and notes at notes 14-26, supra. The stigmatization is particularly strong
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high relief by the overwhelming majority of veterans with honorable
discharges.62 A recent study found that two-thirds of a nationwide
sample of employers asked job applicants how they had been dis-
charged from the military. More than one-fourth of those who inquired
automatically rejected anyone with an undesirable discharge, and a
large majority of the other three-fourths were influenced in their hir-
ing decisions by the type of discharge.63 These findings confirm the
impressions of the witnesses before the Ervin Subcommittee on Con-
stitutional Rights.(4 The harm to employment potential is greatest in
jobs requiring either reputable character or a security clearance.6 5
Licensed professional employment is sharply curtailed.6 Although an
undesirable discharge does not automatically bar civilian employment
with the United States, it interferes with security clearance and denies
the potential employee his Civil Service veterans' preference."r
Numerous decisions have recognized that undesirable and bad-conduct
discharges have essentially identical effects on recipients.68 The Court
of Claims has stated: "To the public generally, a less-than-honorable
discharge carries the damaging implication that an individual has been
declared unfit for retention in the Armed Forces of the United States.
Often, the difference between an undesirable and a dishonorable dis-
charge is one which is either misunderstood or has no connotation
with respect to homosexuality; because many homosexuals receive an undesirable dis-
charge, all recipients of the discharge may be suspected of homosexuality. See 1966 Hear-
ings, supra note 41, at 235.
62 During 1962-1965 honorable discharges constituted approximately 93 percent of the
enlisted separations from the Army. Id. at 1036. Although the proportion of less than
honorable discharges increased during the later stages of the Vietnam War, honorable
discharges continued to account for over 90 percent of enlisted separations. 1971 Hearings,
supra note 2, at 5868-70. Judicial recognition of the normality of the honorable discharge
appears in Bland v. Connally, 293 F.2d 852, 858 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1961) and Sofranoff v.
United States, 165 Ct. Cl. 470, 478 (1964).
63 Jones, supra note 1, at 18-20; cf. Dougherty & Lynch, supra note 11, at 517 n.85.
Although commentators agree that the undesirable discharge has some prejudicial effect
on employment, id. at 499-500; Everett, supra note 11, at 45 & n.21; Lane, supra note 3,
at 97-100, only Captain Jones has attempted a statistical verification.
64 See, e.g., 1962 Hearings, supra note 3, at 187-88 (Chief Judge Quinn, Court of Mili-
tary Appeals), 328 (Congressman Doyle), 336 (Mr. Charles Mayer). Military witnesses con-
ceded the existence of the stigma but considered it appropriate. E.g., id. at 10 (Assistant
Secretary of Defense Runge); see Lane, supra note 3, at 99-100; text and notes at notes
86-92 infra.
65 See 1962 Hearings, supra note 4, at 188; Jones, supra note I, at 13-14.
68 Jones, supra note 1, at 20.
67 See id. at 12-13.
08 E.g., Van Bourg v. Nitze, 388 F.2d 557 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Stapp v. Resor, 314 F. Supp.
475 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Glidden v. United States, 185 Ct. CL 515 (1968). Other cases are
collected in Jones, supra note I, at 15 n.72.
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whatever."69 Although employers show some recognition of the differ-
ence between undesirable and bad-conduct discharges, the departure
from the norm of honorable discharge is much more important to
them than finely distinguished shades of disapprobation.
70
The federal government itself takes even less cognizance of these
technical distinctions than do employers. Undesirable and bad-con-
duct discharges identically affect eligibility for statutory benefits not
administered by the Veterans Administration, such as reemployment
rights and Civil Service preferences. 71 Eligibility for Veterans Admin-
istration benefits, such as hospitalization and medical care, educa-
tional payments, and guaranteed loans, requires a discharge "under con-
ditions other than dishonorable," 72 which may include either an un-
desirable discharge or a bad-conduct discharge issued by a special
court martial.73 Either discharge, if issued for willful and persistent
misconduct, homosexual acts, or conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, deprives the recipient of benefits.74
2. Institutional Bias. The magnitude of an individual's interest in
procedural protections is affected not only by the severity of the con-
sequences he faces but also by the structure of the adjudicating
agency.75 The institutional characteristics of the undesirable discharge
proceeding create a strong possibility of undue severity.
69 Coan v. United States, 376 F.2d 878, 881 (Ct. Cl. 1967)..
70 Jones concludes that 75 percent of those he surveyed are negatively influenced by
the bad-conduct discharge, 69 percent by the undesirable discharge, and 51 percent by
the general discharge (supposedly under "honorable conditions"). Broken down by em-
ployer type, his data shows that of those in big business, for example, 77 percent were
negatively influenced by an undesirable discharge and 81 percent were so influenced by a
bad-conduct discharge. Among bar examiners, the figures were 82 percent for the undesir-
able discharge and 85 percent for the bad-conduct. For methodology and complete data,
see Jones, supra note 1, at 16-18 and 22-24.
71 Department of the Army Graphic Training Aid 21-2-1, reprinted in 1971 Hearings,
supra note 2, at 6010. Doubtful cases from other agencies are often referred to the
Veterans Administration for decision. Id. at 6008, 6012.
72 38 U.S.C. § 101(2) (1970); 38 C.F.R. § 3.12(d) (1973); see 1971 Hearings, supra note
2, at 6007-10.
73 The term is defined by the Veterans Administration through a determination on a
case by case basis of whether the grounds for the discharge involved "moral turpitude"
or "persistent" misconduct. 1971 Hearings, supra note 2, at 6009-10.
74 Id. A bad-conduct discharge issued by a general court-martial, however, bars Veterans
Administration benefits absolutely. 38 U.S.C. § 3103(a); 38 C.F.R. § 3.12(c)(2) (1972).
75 See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,
269 (1970); cf. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80-81 (1972). Bias in the sense of policy
preference in discretionary decisions must be distinguished from bias which prevents
objective consideration of the factual grounds for taking any action at all. Cf. Morrissey
v. Brewer, supra, at 479-80. The former, though perhaps reprehensible, is not considered
a denial of due process. See FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, at 702-03 (1948);
2 K.C. DAvis, supra note 53, § 12.01, at 145 (1958). It is difficult, however, to distinguish
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Unlike the involuntary disabilities that lead to honorable or general
discharge, the grounds for undesirable discharge are voluntary acts,70
and therefore are likely to provoke personal hostility from the officers
accusing the serviceman. His formal accuser is always his commanding
officer,77 who may regard the proceeding as a personal contest of will
with a rebellious subordinate. If the serviceman is accused of "frequent
and discreditable involvement," the principal witnesses against him
are his immediate military superiors;78 if he is accused of homosexuality,
they are military chaplains and doctors.7 9 The administrative discharge
board is likely to give their allegations great weight.
The hearing board is composed of temporarily assigned officers who
are normally in command of troops. Many have commanded "unde-
sirable" servicemen; the rest may reasonably expect to do so. They are
likely to identify strongly with the commander, who needs to maintain
discipline by removing troublesome personnel. They are also likely
to overestimate the problems a commander may face if other soldiers
doubt the swiftness and certainty of undesirable discharge-regardless
of the recipient's culpability.8 0
The weight of military testimony and the inherent bias of the dis-
charge board permit abuse by commanders. The previous disciplinary
record that justifies discharge for "frequent and discreditable involve-
ment" can be built by a hostile company commander through imposi-
tion of nonjudicial punishments.1 In particular, the strong desire to
remove the suspected homosexual as quickly as possible82 may lead to
exaggeration of the case against him. A certain amount of institutional
bias is also present in the special court-martial situation,88 but the
between a constitutionally acceptable policy preference for removing from the military
certain classes-for example, homosexuals or chronic offenders-and a prejudice which
denies due process by discounting the factual contentions of individuals accused of belong-
ing to that class. See id. § 12.02, at 146-48; K.C. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TRaEAxsE
§ 12.02, at 437 (Supp. 1970).
76 Compare 32 C.F.R. §§ 41.6(h)-O) with id. § 4 1.6(g) (1972). The common factor in the
grounds for discharge for unsuitability is that there are "significant observable defects
apparently beyond the control of the individual." Id. § 41.6(g)(3) (1972).
77 See, e.g., Army Reg. 635-212, 12 (July 15, 1966).
78 See id., Appendix (July 15, 1966).
79 See, e.g., Weir v. United States, 474 F.2d 617 (Ct. C1. 1973).
80 No attempt will be made to explore the problem of the permissible extent of com-
mand influence on military fact finding bodies, a problem inherent in both administrative
discharge and court-martial procedures. See, e.g., Cole v. United States, 171 Ct. Cl. 178(1965). See generally Everett, supra note 11, at 80-81; West, A History of Command Influ-
ence on the Military Judicial System, 18 U.C.LA.L. Rav. 1 (1970).
81 See note 101 infra.
82 See note 85 infra; cf. Benson v. Holloway, 812 F. Supp. 49 (D. Neb. 1970).
83 The UCMJ does attempt to limit command influence on courts-martial by prohibiting
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greater potential for abuse of the undesirable discharge can hardly be
read as justifying fewer procedural protections.
B. The Military Interest
The undesirable discharge is not needed as a fast and simple pro-
cedure for removing unwanted personnel from the service. Summarily
imposed general or honorable discharges effectively serve that need.
Where punitive action is the only need, the bad-conduct or dishonor-
able discharge can be imposed through court-martial. The only inter-
est that is served by the undesirable discharge, therefore, is the need
for a discharge procedure that results in punitive consequences without
the formality and expense of court-martial. 84 An undesirable discharge
is attractive to the Armed Forces when court-martial would be redun-
dant (where the serviceman has been convicted by a civilian court); un-
available (where he is a chronic military offender); or unlikely to lead
to conviction (where he could be prosecuted under the UCMJ, but the
case against him is weak).8 5
An undesirable discharge that reflects a civilian conviction serves a
special service interest because the Supreme Court has eliminated
courts-martial jurisdiction over non-service-connected crimes.8 6 It is
not possible to give these men bad-conduct or dishonorable discharges,
87
yet some form of separation noting that their service ended because of
a felony conviction is appropriate. Procedural safeguards are provided
when guilt is determined in the civilian court; it would be pointless to
evaluation or censure of court members or counsel based on their performance. 10 U.S.C.
§ 837 (1970); MCM, supra note 21, 38, at 8-3-4. See generally West, supra note 80.
84 Bland v. Connally, 293 F.2d 852, 858 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
85 See 1966 Hearings, supra note 41, at 361-80 (Brigadier General Berg, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense); 1962 Hearings, supra note 4, at 139. The desire to evade the stric-
tures of the UCMJ is particularly pronounced where homosexuality is alleged. See 1966
Hearings, supra note 41, at 87-88, 131, 382, 393; 1962 Hearings, supra note 4, at 10, 20-
22,50.
86 O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969). The concept of "service connection" is
not, however, free from ambiguity. See Relford v. Commandant, United States Disciplinary
Barracks, 401 U.S. 355 (1971). The restriction on jurisdiction extends only to crimes com-
mitted within the jurisdiction of American civilian courts. United States v. Keeton, 19
U.S.C.M.A. 64, 41 C.M.R. 64 (1969). Nevertheless, it is the policy of the Armed Forces not
to prosecute an individual who has been tried in a foreign court. Agreement Between the
Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of their Forces, June 19, 1951,
art. VII, para. 8, 4 U.S.T. 1792, 1802; 1966 Hearings, supra note 41, at 364-65. See also
Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957) (manslaughter of Japanese civilian, soldier released
to Japanese courts); 32 C.F.R. § 151.3 (1972).
87 The dishonorable and bad-conduct discharges can be given only by court-martial.
See Army Reg. 635-200, change no. 5, 1-5, 11-1 (June 12, 1968); Pasley, Sentence First
-Verdict Afterwards: Dishonorable Discharges Without Trial By Court Martial, 41
CoarNLL L. Rav. 545, 551-55 (1956).
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repeat them when acting on the record of that conviction. The military
interest in an informal, inexpensive procedure thus appears quite
strong in these circumstances.
The undesirable discharge is primarily used, however, to discipline
the chronic military offender, who is suspected of seeking an easy way
out of the service. s8 He has "frequent and discreditable involvements,"
but no crimes serious enough for discharge by court-martial. 9 He is
described by military spokesmen as "the person who does not break
the line; he does not necessarily go a.w.o.l., . . . steal[,] or refuse to
obey. It is just a repetition, a constant disciplinary problem, not reach-
ing the point of trial, but.., of no value to the command.... .9 0 These
individuals are a burden on the service, and if they cannot be rehabil-
itated they must be separated.91 Yet deliberate resistance would be a
rational strategy for the unwilling soldier if honorable separation were
the only available procedure short of a punitive discharge by court-
martial. He could force an early separation and escape the burdens of
his full enlistment without disadvantage. The threat of a "chronic
offender" undesirable discharge is meant to raise the cost of escaping
the obligations of military service.92 This is clearly a valid military in-
88 In the Air Force, for example, frequent and discreditable involvement is the ground
for between 25 and 30 percent of undesirable discharges. The next most common grounds
are drug abuse and sexual perversion. 1971 Hearings, supra note 2, at 5887.
89 The chronic military offender with two minor court-martial convictions could be
given a bad-conduct discharge upon his third conviction. See note 26 supra. This would
require his commander to build a record for eventual discharge by dealing with minor
misconduct through court-martial instead of nonjudicial punishment. The policy of the
Armed Forces, however, is to use nonjudidal punishment for minor offenses because it is
swifter, more lenient, and carries fewer long-term consequences than court-martial. 1966
Hearings, supra note 41, at 372-74. Exclusive reliance on the "two-conviction" rule would
compel the company commander to treat each incident as part of a potential foundation
for a punitive discharge, instead of as an isolated transgression to be corrected and hope-
fully forgotten.
90 1962 Hearings, supra note 4, at 22; cf. id. at 50, 63.
91 See 1966 Hearings, supra note 41, at 360; 1962 Hearings, supra note 4, at 10, 50.
92 See 1962 Hearings, supra note 4, at 50. See generally R. POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYsIs
OF LAW § 25.6, at 368 (1972). A bizarre example of the lengths taken to get out of the Army
is Weir v. United States, 474 F.2d 617 (Ct. Cl. 1973). Weir received a general discharge
for homosexual tendencies after successfully lying about them to a chaplain, his com-
manding officer, and an Army psychiatrist. He sued for back pay in the Court of Claims,
arguing that the Army had not followed its own regulations. Had his superiors investigated
his self-accusations of homosexuality, as required by Army regulations, they would perhaps
have caught him in his lie. Since they did not catch him, Weir maintained, the regulation
had not been complied with. The Court of Claims was not persuaded.
Using the undesirable discharge to "prevent the dilution of the honorable discharge,"
1962 Hearings, supra note 4, at 181, is merely another expression of deterrence. The
honorable discharge is recognized as the overwhelming norm, but it is not given as a
matter of course. "Proper military behavior and proficient performance of duty" are
required for an honorable discharge. 32 C.F.R. § 41.5(a) (1972). Military spokesmen con-
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terest; less clear is the extent to which this interest justifies denials of
procedural protections.
Different military interests are involved when the serviceman is
processed for an act that could be dealt with by court-martial and
punitive discharge. In those cases, an undesirable discharge is con-
cededly used to avoid court-martial protections when the complainant
is unable to testify, or when a requirement of proof beyond a reason-
able doubt standard would thwart conviction.9 3 Where homosexuality is
alleged, the use of a lower standard of proof has been defended on the
ground that unit morale would suffer if the troops were forced to
associate with a man under even a "strong suspicion" of homosexual-
ity.94 An undesirable discharge for acts constituting crimes under the
UCMJ has also been used where search and seizure protections would
interefere with the evidence admissible in a court-martial. 95 The
"UCMJ" undesirable discharge serves the same purposes as a court-
martial: determination of guilt or innocence and punishment for
crime. 6 Because a functioning military judicial system is available,
there is little legitimate need for administrative processing of these
offenders. Infficting punishment without the procedural constraints
that the Constitution and Congress impose is not a valid military
interest.97
III. SPECIFIC APPLICATIONS OF DUE PRocEss
The Armed Forces' regulations deny the potential recipient of an un-
desirable discharge three important procedural protections that are
recognized as necessary for a bad-conduct discharge: the right to sub-
poena and to cross-examine witnesses; the requirement of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt; and the right to an adequate definition of the acts
constituting violations.
The lack of these protections does not greatly prejudice the service-
sider it unfair not to distinguish those who accepted the burden of military service from
those who deliberately shrugged it. 1962 Hearings, supra note 4, at 50. Not only is it
unfair, it is also considered harmful to discipline to "negate the incentives now operating
in favor of truly honorable service." Id.
93 See 1966 Hearings, supra note 41, at 87-88, 368; 1962 Hearings, supra note 4, at 20-
22, 139.
94 1962 Hearings, supra note 4, at 21-22.
95 E.g., Crawford v. Davis, 249 F. Supp. 943, 948-49 (E.D. Pa. 1966); cf. Pickell v. Reed,
326 F. Supp. 1086 (N.D. Cal. 1971) where illegal search issues existed but were not raised.
See generally Lane, supra note 3, at 108-10.
9B See text at notes 15-26 supra; cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27-30 (1967).
97 Clackum v. United States, 296 F.2d 226, 228 (Ct. Cl. 1961); cf. Kauffman v. Secretary
of the Air Force, 415 F.2d 991, 997 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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man convicted in a civilian court.98 In prosecutions for frequent and
discreditable involvement, however, these deficiencies present more
difficult problems. In those cases, the discharge decision focuses on a
record of previous minor court-martials and nonjudicial punishments,99
which is only a summary of the charges and the actions taken. 00 The
nonjudicial punishments have been imposed by the serviceman's com-
manding officer without effective procedural safeguards. 01 The hear-
ing board must determine whether this record of previous punish-
ments, as amplified and explained by other evidence, warrants an
undesirable discharge, a more creditable discharge, or rehabilitation.
Its decision, though discretionary, depends on findings of fact which
the serviceman has a strong interest in contesting.
The serviceman's interest in fully presenting his case is even more
compelling when he is accused of a crime punishable under the UCMJ.
In those cases the discharge board makes the only determination of
guilt and imposes punishment, and the safeguards in that hearing are
the only ones the serviceman will receive. The only military interests
served by this proceeding are administrative convenience and avoid-
ance of the protections of the court-martial. In sharp contrast, the
serviceman's civilian future may be blighted by the unjustified im-
position of a penalty having the effect of a conviction.10 2
In the "civilian conviction" case, the military interest seems to
justify the truncated proceeding, and in the "UCMJ" situation the
military does not appear to have any interests sufficient to justify deny-
ing procedural protections. The military interests are greater in the
"chronic offender" situation than in the "UCMJ" discharge, but the bal-
ancing of interests in both "UGMJ" and "chronic offender" proceed-
ings deserves closer examination in the context of the particular pro-
tections denied.
98 See note 108 infra.
99 See, e.g., Army Reg. 635-212, Appendix (July 15, 1966) which is a sample of the
complete record of an undesirable discharge proceeding based on frequent and discredit-
able involvement. See 1966 Hearings, supra note 41, at 372-73.
100 The summary records of previous convictions and nonjudidal punishments are
shown in Army Reg. 635-212, Appendix, at 32-38 (July 15, 1966). The record of non-
judicial punishment need not contain any elaboration of the facts beyond a bare specifica-
tion of the charge. E.g., id. at 33. See also MCM, supra note 21, 133a. The record of a
summary court-martial contains no abstract of the evidence. Id., Appendix I.
101 The serviceman given nonjudicial punishment under Article 15 of the UCMJ, 10
U.S.C. § 815 (1970), is punished by his company or battalion commander, who is also the
prosecutor. The serviceman has no right to counsel, confrontation, or cross-examination.
The soldier may refuse Article 15 punishment, but by doing so he risks greater punish-
ment. See generally Note, The Unconstitutional Burden of Article 15, 82 YAMt L.J. 1481,
1484 n.12 (1973).
.02 See text and notes at notes 61-74 supra.
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A. Confrontation and Subpoena
The Supreme Court has explicitly recognized the importance of both
the right of confrontation 0 3 and the right of a defendant to subpoena
witnesses in his behalf.04
In the special court-martial context it has been established that the
rights of confrontation and cross-examination are constitutionally re-
quired.10 5 It has also been explicitly stated that the right to subpoena
witnesses, as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, applies to court-
martial proceedings. 1 6 In the undesirable discharge situation, however,
both rights are severely circumscribed. 0
7
Cross-examination is of special significance where the justification
for an undesirable discharge is "frequent and discreditable involve-
ment."'08 The record of previous punishments usually requires am-
plification by witnesses-often current and former superiors, who are
normally available without subpoena' 9 -to both the recorded inci-
dents and the present usefulness of the serviceman. In cases of drug
use, sex offenses, or failure to pay debts, civilian testimony can be
critical.110
Undesirable discharge hearings based on crimes under the UCMJ
present essentially the same evidentiary problems as prosecution before
a special court-martial; only the gravity of the maximum penalties
103 See, e.g., Greene v. McElroy, 360 US. 474 (1959).
104 See, e.g., Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
105 United States v. Jacoby, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 428, 29 C.M.R. 244 (1960).
106 United States v. Sweeney, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 599, 34 C.M.R. 879 (1964); cf. United States
v. Thornton, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 446,24 C.M.R. 256 (1957).
107 The board's lack of subpoena power and its informal rules of evidence allow the
prosecution to introduce statements from unavailable witnesses. The lack of subpoena
power also limits the serviceman's ability to produce civilian witnesses in his own behalf.
See text and notes at notes 53-38 supra.
108 See text and notes at notes 99-101 supra. Because the evidence in discharge pro-
ceedings for civilian conviction consists almost exclusively of judicial records, cross-
examination is not important. A board of three legally untrained individuals, furthermore,
is not the appropriate form for collateral attack on a civilian criminal conviction.
109 See Army Reg. 635-212, Appendix, at 24-30 (July 15, 1966). Although the Army
provides for the transfer of chronic military offenders to give them a second chance in
another unit, the transfer is normally confined to the same post or area. Army Reg. 635-
212, change no. 11, 7b(2), (3) (March, 1971). Unavailability of witnesses who might be
transferred is covered by Army Reg. 635-212, 14d (July 15, 1966); the discharge authority
is directed to retain such persons in his command unless their legal term of enlistment
has expired and they must be discharged. Discharged witnesses are beyond military control
and cannot be ordered to appear, although the commander is directed to obtain their
depositions or affidavits before discharge. Cf. text and notes at notes 35-38 supra.
110 E.g., Glidden v. United States, 185 Ct. Cl. 515 (1968); 1962 Hearings, supra note 4,
at 139; see Lynch, supra note 11, at 154-55; Note, Imprisonment for Debt: In the Military
Tradition, 80 YALE L.J. 1679, 1682-83, 1685-88 (1971).
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differs. The six-month imprisonment which a special court-martial
can impose is insignificant beside the continuing civilian consequences
of undesirable discharge. Confrontation and subpoena rights in the un-
desirable discharge situation should therefore accord with the rights of
the serviceman in courts-martial. In courts-martial the rules for com-
pelling attendance by civilian witnesses are virtually the same as in
criminal proceedings in the federal courts.'11
The discharge board that conducts an undesirable discharge pro-
ceeding, in stark contrast, has no power to compel the attendance of
civilian witnesses, irrespective of the materiality of their testimony or
convenience of attendance."12 There are no cases that hold cross-exam-
ination or subpoena powers to be an element of fundamental fairness
in this situation, but three cases suggest it. In Bland v. Connally,"3 the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit avoided the
confrontation issue, basing its decision on statutory grounds. The
court stated, however, that if forced to decide whether cross-examina-
tion in an administrative discharge proceeding is required by due
process, it would "seriously doubt whether the Constitution would
condone the infliction of such injury, in the service of an interest so
111 See note 45 supra. The military judge, however, is permitted to balance convenience
of attendance against materiality of testimony in deciding whether to issue a subpoena to
a civilian. MCM, supra note 21, 115a, at 23-1. The power to compel the attendance of
military witnesses on active duty is the same for discharge boards and courts-martial. The
Army provides for the attendance of military witnesses unless they "reside or are on duty
at a substantial distance from the installation at which the hearing is being conducted."
Army Reg. 15-6, 13b (Aug. 12, 1965); cf. MCM, supra note 21, 115a, b, at 23-1-2.
If this inconvenience arises in a court-martial, only deposition evidence may be sub-
stituted. See MCM, supra note 21, 145a, at 27-42; id. I 146b, at 27-47; cf. 10 U.S.C.
§ 849(d) (1970). In undesirable discharge proceedings, however, mere statement evidence
may also be substituted. E.g., Army Reg. 15-6, 9 (Aug. 12, 1966). The accused has the
right to be present in person and to have counsel for cross-examination when a deposition
is taken for use as evidence in a court-martial. United States v. Giles, 42 C.M.R. 880 (Ct.
of Mil. Review 1970); MCM, supra note 21, 117b(2), at 23-5. Deposition evidence is
admissible in courts-martial only when the witness is unavailable for the reasons specified
in 10 U.S.C. § 849(d) (1970), and the absence is not the fault of the Armed Forces. See,
e.g., United States v. Gaines, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 557, 43 C.M.R. 397 (1971). See generally
McGovern, The Military Oral Deposition and Modern Communications, 45 Mmr. L. Rav.
43 (1969).
112 See Dougherty & Lynch, supra note 11, at 512-13; Lynch, supra note 11, at 154; text
at notes 37-38.
113 293 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1961). Bland involved an undesirable discharge for security
reasons that was based on secret evidence. The problem in the nonsecurity undesirable
discharge is less serious. In the latter case, evidence is made available to the respondent,
although in documentary form. E.g., Glidden v. United States, 185 Ct. Cl. 515 (1968); see
Army Reg. 15--6, 1% 11, 16 (Aug. 12, 1966). Rebuttal by other evidence is possible, but the
preferred technique of impeachment through cross-examination is not.
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relatively weak, without the protection of the right of confrontation."'114
In Glidden v. United States,"5 a serviceman was denied the opportu-
nity to confront civilian police officers who had accused him of homo-
sexual acts. The Court of Claims emphasized the importance of con-
frontation, but found it unnecessary to reach the constitutional issue
because the Air Force had violated its regulations by refusing to re-
quest the civilians to appear for cross-examination. 116 Glidden was ap-
proved by the same court in Cason v. United States,"I7 but the con-
stitutional issue was avoided once again: the serviceman was denied
the right to confront a locally available military witness in clear vio-
lation of the regulations.""
Only one court has suggested a contrary result. In Pickell v. Reed," 9
the district court stated that, despite the lack of compulsory process to
ensure opportunity for cross-examination, the regulations are "essen-
tially fair.., and meet the requirements of due process for purposes
of undesirable discharge."'120 The issue was raised, however, in the
context of a predischarge attack on the facial validity of the regula-
tions. Unlike the servicemen in the cases above, Pickell had not re-
ceived a discharge. The plaintiff therefore could not allege the use of
specific testimony that might have been viewed differently if cross-
examination were allowed, and the court was merely holding that the
plaintiff's claim of facial invalidity lacked sufficient likelihood of
success on the merits to justify a preliminary injunction.' 2'
The field board's inability to compel attendance of witnesses appears
to be a problem of legislative inertia. Congress has failed to respond
to Defense Department initiatives for a broader grant of subpoena
powers to the discharge boards. 22 The courts should not, however,
allow congressional indifference to dilute the requirements of due proc-
ess. There are no convincing reasons for the disparity between con-
114 293 F.2d at 858.
115 185 Ct. Cl. 515 (1968).
116 Id. at 521.
117 471 F.2d 1225 (Ct. CI. 1973).
118 Id. at 1231.
119 326 F. Supp. 1086 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
120 Id. at 1090. This may be attributed to the general reluctance of courts to sustain
predischarge attacks on undesirable discharges when the attacks are based on constitu-
tional grounds. See, e.g., id.; Scofield v. United States, 297 F. Supp. 1353 (D.P.R. 1969);
Unglesby v. Zimny, 250 F. Supp. 714 (NJ). Cal. 1965); Crawford v. Davis, 249 F. Supp.
943 (E.D. Pa. 1966). But cf. Covington v. Schwartz, 230 F. Supp. 249 (N.D. Cal. 1964), aff'd,
341 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1965). See generally Suter, supra note 54, at 73-77.
121 326 F. Supp. at 1090.
122 See H.R. 523, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1161(b); 1971 Hearings, supra note 2, at 5846-
47, 5854; Lane, supra note 3, at 112-13.
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frontational and subpoena rights in courts-martial and in "chronic
offender" and "UCMJ" undesirable discharge hearings. The Armed
Forces' only legitimate reason for limiting these rights is the incon-
venience of transporting witnesses from far-flung stations. Although
this justifies the disparity between civilian and military rights, 123 there
are no convincing reasons for making a distinction between the two
military proceedings. 24 Testimony offered without opportunity for
cross-examination, therefore, must be excluded from undesirable dis-
charge proceedings unless it falls within one of the exceptions that
apply to courts-martial, 25 and the discharge boards must be granted
the same subpoena powers as the military courts.
B. Standard of Proof
In re Winship12 held what had long been assumed: that proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt is an essential element of due process in
criminal proceedings. As Justice Harlan said in his concurrence:
In a criminal case, on the other hand, we do not view the social
disutility of convicting an innocent man as equivalent to the dis-
utility of acquitting someone who is guilty .... [We] view the re-
quirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case
as bottomed on a fundamental value determination of our society
that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty
man go free.127
The current Armed Services regulations make few references to the
standard of proof for a recommendation of undesirable discharge. The
Marine Corps requires a preponderance of the evidence; 128 the Army
is satisfied with "such evidence as reasonable men can accept as ade-
quate to support a conclusion.' 29
The possible harm from error, although perhaps not as great as in
civilian criminal or juvenile cases, clearly outweighs the services' in-
terest in these standards of proof. If the board errs against the service-
123 See note 111 supra.
124 The only reason expressed by military officials for the present lack of subpoena
power is the time and expense of its potentially excessive use. 1966 Hearings, supra note
41, at 389-90. The then Judge Advocate General of the Army admitted, however, that
this problem could easily be overcome by using the same restrictions on the number of
witnesses as are applied in courts-martial. Id. at 390; see note 111 supra.
125 See note 111 supra.
126 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
127 Id. at 372.
128 32 C.F.R. § 730.73(c)(20) (1972).
129 Army Reg. 15-6, 20 (Aug. 12, 1966). The Air Force requires "evidence of sufficient
weight to be convincing." 32 C.F.R. § 866.9 (1972). The Navy regulations articulate no
standard of proof.
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man, he may bear the stigma of an undesirable discharge. If it errs in
his favor, he may still be separated under honorable conditions by the
discharge authority.130 The only loss to the service in the latter case is
some small increment of deterrence. It is necessary, however, to con-
sider separately the standards of proof appropriate for "UCMJ" and for
"chronic offender" discharges.' 31
1. Standard of Proof for Acts Considered Crimes Under the UCMJ.
In the case of the serviceman accused of drug, sex, or other criminal
offenses, the discharge board performs the same function as a court-
martial and imposes essentially the same penalty. The undesirable dis-
charge is used as an alternative to court-martial, a practice uniformly
condemned by the courts that have alluded to it.132
The individual's interest in protection from factual errors is no less
when he is processed administratively. In theory, a special court-martial
can impose six months' imprisonment as well as a bad-conduct dis-
charge. In practice, the services discharge-rather than imprison-
drug users' 33 and nonviolent homosexuals' 34 as soon as possible if re-
habilitation is unwarranted. Although imprisonment may be perceived
as a greater immediate harm, the serviceman's major interest is in
avoiding the long-term effect of an other than honorable discharge.
35
130 See, e.g., Birt v. United States, 180 Ct. Cl. 910 (1967).
131 Undesirable discharge proceedings based on civilian conviction present little prob-
lem of proof. See note 108 supra.
132 Birt v. United States, 180 Ct. Cl. 910 (1967); Clackum v. United States, 296 F.2d 226
(Ct. Cl. 1961); United States v. Phipps, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 14, 30 C.M.R. 14 (1960) (Quinn, C.J.,
concurring); cf. Rowe v. United States, 167 Ct. Cl. 468 (1964). The Court of Claims has
observed that the commander's power to choose between court-martial and administrative
action is "as if a prosecuting attorney were authorized, in a case where he concluded that
he didn't have enough evidence to obtain a conviction in court, to himself impose the
fine or imprisonment which he thought the accused person deserved." Clackum v. United
States, supra, at 228. The regulations allow the undesirable discharge to be awarded in
lieu of court-martial if the discharge authority considers it in the best interest of the
service and the individual. See the Army and Air Force regulations summarized in 1966
Hearings, supra note 41, at 776, 781. For some examples of "the best interests of the
service," see text and notes at notes 93-96 supra. There is no statutory right to demand
court-martial instead of undesirable discharge. Rowe held that the enacting statute for
the UCMJ preserved the then existing authority to issue administrative discharges under
other than honorable conditions. 167 Ct. Cl. at 470-72; see Act of May 5, 1950, Art. 140,
§ 5, 64 Stat. 107, 145; 41 Stat. 809. No case has decided whether there is a constitutional
right to demand court-martial. The confusion of "administrative" and "judicial" labels
can be best avoided, though, by attacking an undesirable discharge imposed after a timely
demand for court-martial as a denial of specific elements of due process-for example,
proof beyond reasonable doubt. Cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
133 See 32 C.F.R. §§ 62.1-4 (1972) (classification of and policy towards drug users).
134 See 1966 Hearings, supra note 41, at 778, 780 (classification of and policy towards
homosexuals).
135 E.g., "You do not find a fellow very, very often asking for a court-martial instead of
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Perhaps in recognition of this, the UCMJ requires more procedural
protection for punitive discharge by court-martial than for imprison,
ment.136 The undesirable discharge is so nearly identical to the bad-
conduct discharge that the serviceman's interest in avoiding it is the
same. Without the special discretionary problem of the chronic of-
fender, the military interest in imposing a punitive discharge is no
greater in administrative cases than in court-martial cases. Due process
therefore requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt in "UCMJ" un-
desirable discharge cases.
2. Standard of Proof for "Frequent and Discreditable Involvement."
Proceedings involving chronic military offenders are inherently error-
prone.137 None of the services set clear standards; the discharge board
is expected to know a chronic military offender when it sees one.138
Proof beyond rea%onable doubt, however, may be too demanding. The
Armed Forces must be able to deter potential chronic offenders by
use of the undesirable discharge, and can be expected to abandon
reluctantly personnel whose training represents a substantial invest-
ment. Whether a particular individual has future military worth is a
decision that depends on the technical expertise of the board, "Moral
certainty," 1 9 as the military characterizes proof beyond reasonable
doubt, would greatly restrict the exercise of the discharge board's
judgment.
The courts have not considered this question, The standard of proof
required in deportation hearings, however, suggests a possible solution.
Although a deportation hearing is not a criminal proceeding, 40 it im-
poses a substantial personal hardship. In Woodby v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service, the Supreme Court held that the hardship of
administrative action, because when he asks for a court-martial, he visualizes himself sit-
ting in jail or something like that, and this lie does not want." 1962 Hearings, supra note
4, at 139 (Brigadier General Kuhfeld); cf. 1966 Hearings, supra note 41, at 377. However,
a man may be convicted once .by a special court-martial, serve a six-month sentence, and
still earn a discharge under honorable conditions. Army Reg. 635-200, 1-7d(2), 1-7e
(June 12, 1968); cf. 82 C.F.R. § 730.52(a)(1) (1972) (Marine Corps).
136 A special court-martial that imposes a bad-conduct discharge must include a
military judge and general court-martial qualified counsel, and it must keep a verbatim
record to facilitate review. These features are not necessary if the court-martial imposes
its maximum authorized sentence of six months imprisonment. 10 U.S.C. § 819 (1970).
137 See text at notes 75-83 supra.
138 "I do not think I can give you a rule of thumb in terms of how many offenses. I
suggest that the chronic military offender.., is the sort of individual that every company
commander understands exactly of whom you speak [sic]." 1962 Hearings, supra note 4,
at 22 (Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower Runge); cf. 52 C.F.R. § 730.66(b) (1972)
(Marine Corps), quoted at note 149 infra.
139 MCM, supra note 21, 74a(3), at 13--4.
140 Harisiades v. Shaughnessey, 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
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deportation required proof by "clear, unequivocal, and convincing
evidence,"1 41 a standard between preponderance and reasonable doubt.
Although what is clear, unequivocal, and convincing is no more quan-
tifiable than what is a preponderance of the evidence, it expresses a
greater sense of certainty than that required in a negligence case.142 It
is used in civil litigation when issues of reputation-such as fraud,
adultery, and bastardy-are contested. 43 Requiring proof by clear, un-
equivocal, and convincing evidence would retain the discharge board's
discretion, yet provide greater protection to the serviceman than a
"preponderance" standard.
C. The Vagueness of "Frequent and Discreditable Involvement' u44
In Avrech v. Secretary of the Navy,145 the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit held that Article 134 of the UCMJ, the
General Article, was unconstitutionally vague on its face. The relevant
portion of the statute provides:
Though not specifically mentioned in this chapter, all disorders
and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the
armed forces, all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the
armed forces... shall be taken cognizance of by a... court-martial
... and shall be punished at the discretion of that court.14
Article 134 has been elucidated by numerous decisions of the Court
of Military Appeals and over seventy specifications in the Manual for
Courts-Martial;147 nevertheless, the court in Avrech held it did not
"provide an ascertainable standard of guilt,' ' 148
141 385 U.S. 276, 285 (1966).
142 Id.
143 9 J. WcmiolE, EVMENCE § 2498, at 329--34 (3d ed. 1940). The Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit now also requires dear, unequivocal, and convincing
proof in civil commitments for mental illness because of the magnitude of the injury
involved. The court pointed out that the higher standard of proof would offset the
speculative nature of the evidence in that type of proceeding. In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648
(D.C. Cir. 1973).
144 Vagueness of the grounds for the "UCMJ" undesirable discharge is a less serious
problem. To the extent that the conduct described in the text at notes 21-25 supra does
constitute crimes under the UCMJ, the definiteness of the grounds for discharge is derived
from the definiteness of the punitive articles of the Code. It has been argued by the
Armed Forces, however, that the grounds for undesirable discharge may include conduct
not prohibited by the UCMJ and not otherwise defined. See 1966 Hearings, supra note 41,
at 367-72. If that is the case, the vagueness argument set forth below is applicable.
145 477 F.2d 1237 (D.C. Cir. 1973), prob. juris. noted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3194 (U.S. Oct. 9, 1973).
140 10 US.C. § 934 (1970).
147 See 477 F.2d at 1240; MCM, supra note 21, Appendix 6c, at A6-20-26.
148 477 F.2d at 1241; accord, Levy v. Parker, 478 F.2d 772, 796 (3d Cir. 1973) (Article
133 of the UCMJ, penalizing conduct "unbecoming an officer and a gentleman," held
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The regulation authorizing undesirable discharge for "frequent
involvement of a discreditable nature with military or civilian author-
ities" has never been judicially construed or administratively nar-
rowed.149 An undesirable discharge on that ground thus raises the void-
for-vagueness issue. A penal statute is void on its face as a denial of due
process if it is unnecessarily vague.'r5 The vagueness doctrine ensures
that the citizen receives sufficient notice of the law's demands, 151 and
prevents enforcement officers from engaging in harassment unrelated
to legitimate prohibitions on conduct. 152 The vagueness doctrine ap-
plies to military as well as civilian offenses, except where it is shown
that conditions peculiar to military life require a different rule.
1 53
The vagueness standard applies not only to statutes, but also to rules
made under statutory authority that have the force of law.'5 Such
rules must be promulgated by the proper procedure under statutory
authority, and they must be reasonable. 155 The military regulations
unconstitutionally vague); cf. Stolte v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 1392 (D.D.C. 1972) (specification
under Article 134 forbidding "disloyal statements" held unconstitutionally vague).
149 On the contrary, the Marine Corps states that "no specific number of acts or
omissions are contemplated herein. Each case must be evaluated in light of its own
particular facts to determine whether ... the member concerned has clearly demonstrated
that he is unqualified for retention and, if so, whether the character of his service has
been other than honorable." 32 C.F.R. § 730.66(b)(2) (1972).
150 See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) (dictum); Papa-
christou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972). See generally Comment, The Void
for Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. Rav. 67 (1960). The undesir-
able discharge is essentially penal in both intent and effect. See text and notes at notes
61-74 and 86-96 supra.
151' See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162-67 (1972) and cases
cited therein.
152 See, e.g., id. at 168-71; Levy v. Parker, 478 F;2d 772, 793 (1973).
153 Avrech v. Secretary of the Navy, 477 F.2d 1237, 1244 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Kauffman v.
Secretary of the Air Force, 415 F.2d 991, 997 (D.C. Cir. 1969); cf. Levy v. Parker, 478 F.2d
772, 795-96 (3d Cir. 1973).
154 Stolte v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 1392 (D.D.C. 1972) held that certain specifications in
the MCM that interpreted Article 134 of the UCMJ were void for vagueness. A "specifica-
tion" is a description of the "specific facts and circumstances constituting a violation."
MCM, supra note 21, 24a, at 6-I. Until Avrech v. Secretary of the Navy, 477 F.2d 1237
(D.C. Cir. 1973) was decided, the specifications in the MCM were considered sufficient to
save Article 134 from being void for vagueness. United States v. Frantz, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 161,
7 C.M.R. 37 (1953).
The courts do not substitute their judgment for that of the Armed Forces in deciding
whether an individual or class should be discharged from the military. See, e.g., Hagopian
v. Knowlton, 470 F.2d 201, 204 (2d Cir. 1972); cf. Note, judicial Review and Military
Discipline, 72 COLUM. L. Rav. 1048, 1054-56 (1972). It is, however, within their recognized
power to require the Armed Forces to provide intelligible standards in their regulations.
Cf. Hagopian v. Knowlton, supra (West Point cadet ehtitled to notice and hearing before
he can be dismissed for excess demerits).
155 Congress cannot grant the power to do what it may not do itself, including the
passage of unconstitutionally vague legislation. See I K.C. DAvis, supra note 53, § 5.03, at
299 (1958).
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concerning undesirable discharge are promulgated under express statu-
tory authority, and bind the serviceman and the Armed Forces.156 Ex-
cept where military necessity is shown, the regulations must contain an
ascertainable standard of guilt enabling a serviceman of common un-
derstanding to know what the Armed Forces forbid or command on
pain of undesirable discharge.1
57
The standard of conduct provided in the regulation seems incur-
ably vague. "Frequent" and "discreditable" are not defined, and the
administrative review boards do not publish opinions. Military wit-
nesses before the Ervin Subcommittee considered the term "chronic"
-as used in "chronic military offender"-unquantifiable. 158 The only
standard for defining "frequent and discreditable" is "the individual
morality of the convening authority and the three officers sitting on
the administrative discharge board .... ,,159
Undesirable discharge on this ground does require repeated dis-
ciplinary involvement: "frequent" must mean at least two. Moreover,
before the serviceman can be given the discharge, he must be warned
personally that continued misbehavior could result in such a discharge,
and be given an opportunity to reform.160 These minimal forms of
notice, however, do not satisfy the requirements of due process.161 The
serviceman cannot predict what will trigger a warning, and afterward
he is left to speculate on what will be deemed "continued" misbehavior.
The diffuse language of the regulation also invites grossly uneven
application. The Armed Forces must have discretion to characterize
offenders as "chronic"; but that discretion can be structured.1 62 If the
different needs of an infantry battalion, an aircraft carrier, and a com-
156 10 U.S.C. § 1169 (1970); see Murray v. United States, 154 Ct. Cl. 185 (1961); cf.
Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957).
157 See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 163 (1972).
158 See note 138 supra.
159 Lynch, supra note 11, at 150.
160 32 C.F.R. § 41.4(a)(1) (1972); Army Reg. 635-212, 7 (July 15, 1966); 32 C.F.R.
§ 730.12(c) (1972) (Navy). There is, however, no requirement that any particular form of
advice or period for rehabilitation be provided; the Army prefers to rely on the judgment
of the "ordinary sensible commander." 1962 Hearings, supra note 4, at 107. The Army also
provides for a second chance by transferring the individual to a different unit. Army Reg.
635-212, change no. 11, 7b(2), (March 1, 1971).
101 Avrech v. Secretary of the Navy, 477 F.2d 1237, 1243 (D.C. Cir.), prob. juris noted,
94 S. Ct. 64 (1973).
162 Discretion is confined when the scope of discretionary power is limited from out-
side. In this area, the prime example is the limitation of the basis for undesirable discharge
to incidents occurring during the individual's current enlistment. Harmon v. Brucker, 855
U.S. 579 (1958); 32 C.F.R. § 41.4(b) (1972). "Structuring" is the guidance of subordinate
administrators by their superiors on how legitimate discretionary authority should be
exercised. See, e.g., note 164 infra. See generally K.C. DAVIS, DISCRETONARY JUSTICE 54-59,
102-04 (1971).
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munications center, for example, make general definitions difficult to
formulate, the Secretary could issue a general directive to be made
more specific by each discharge authority. The directive would specify
minimum criteria for undesirable dicharge on chronic offender
grounds in the following areas: which offenses are discreditable, and
how they are to be weighted; the number of such offenses, nonjudicial
or court-martial, required before warning the serviceman and before
discharge; intelligence and proficiency test scores below which inability
to comply with military discipline will be presumed and a general
discharge issued; other mitigating circumstances to be considered by
the discharge board. Defining such standards is within the competence
of the Armed Forces. The Navy and Marine Corps have similar stand-
ards for the award of honorable discharges,16 3 and all the services use
similar classifications for processing homosexuality cases. 8 The stand-
ards need not be protective, but they must be ascertainable. 16 5
CONCLUSION
The Armed Forces have strong interests in separating those individ-
uals who will not conform to the military way of life, and in deterring
others from such conduct. Undesirable, bad-conduct, and dishonorable
discharges therefore have a place in the military personnel system.
Nevertheless they are serious sanctions that deprive the serviceman of
important benefits and opportunities, and their imposition must be
accompanied by procedural protections. The serviceman must be given
intelligible standards of behavior and an opportunity to meet them,
and the rights necessary to contest fully the basis for the discharge
action. The present regulations governing undesirable discharges fall
far short of these requirements. The soldier accused of failing to meet
his obligation of honorable service and threatened with undesirable
163 32 C.F.R. §§ 780.2 (Navy), 730.52 (Marine Corps) (1972).
164 See 1966 Hearings, supra note 41, at 778, 780.
165 Frequent and discreditable involvement does not raise-at least facially-first amend-
ment questions. Overbreadth, therefore, is not an issue. Cf. Levy v. Parker, 478 F.2d 772,
793-94 (3d Cir. 1973); Stolte v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 1392, 1401-05 (D.D.C. 1972). The
vagueness problem is cured if the standard for frequent and discreditable involvement is
sufficiently knowable to provide an ascertainable standard of guilt and limit arbitrary
enforcement. See text and notes at notes 151-52 supra.
Classifying Article 15 punishment as a discreditable involvement leaves open the pos-
sibility of arbitrary action. Nonjudicial punishment, however, is necessary for low-level
discipline. See text and note at note 92 supra. Abuses of nonjudicial punishment may be
confined with the least harm to legitimate military needs by providing for cross-examina-
tion of the serviceman's superiors, a higher standard of proof, and administrative clarifica-
tion of the number and type of nonjudicial punishments constituting grounds for undesir-
able discharge.
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discharge must be allowed the same rights of confrontation and sub-
poena accorded those who face similar penalties in more formal pro-
ceedings. The proof required for undesirable discharge must be com-
mensurate with the seriousness of the sanction, qualified only by the
overriding administrative imperatives and considerations of deterrence
present in chronic offender cases. The regulations also must give the
serviceman adequate notice of the actions that may be grounds for unde-
sirable discharge. 66
The Armed Forces' interests are adequately protected by this inter-
pretation of the due process requirements for undesirable discharge.
Procedures for discharging a serviceman convicted by a civilian court
in a fair trial-the clearest candidates for undesirable discharge-
would be unaffected. The chronic military offender could still be
separated from the service with little reduction in deterrent effect and
only minor inconvenience to the Armed Forces. Servicemen who com-
mit acts punishable as crimes under the UCMJ could still be punished
either by court-martial or by an administrative proceeding only
moderately more burdensome to the Armed Forces than the present
practice. Due process requires these minor sacrifices.
James M. Hirschhorn
166 If the courts require these procedural protections in undesirable discharge hearings,
the Armed Forces can provide all except the subpoena power by amending their regula-
tions. The Armed Forces consider the extension of the subpoena power to discharge boards
to be beyond their statutory authority, however, see 1962 Hearings, supra note 4, at 117,
and congressional action would be necessary to create that power. The Department of
Defense has sponsored legislation to authorize subpoenas by administrative discharge
boards. See note 122 supra.
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